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Abstract
Monetary policy affects both intertemporal consumption choices
and portfolio choices between liquid and illiquid assets. The mone-
tary transmission, in turn, depends on the distribution of marginal
propensities to consume and invest. This paper assesses the im-
portance of heterogeneity in these propensities for the transmission
of monetary policy in a New Keynesian business cycle model with
uninsurable income risk and assets with different degrees of liquidity.
Liquidity-constrained households have high propensities to consume
but low propensities to invest, which makes consumption more and
investment less responsive to monetary shocks compared to com-
plete markets. Redistribution through earnings heterogeneity and
the Fisher channel from unexpected inflation further amplifies the
consumption response but dampens the investment response.
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At least since Tobin (1969) it is well understood that a satisfactory
understanding of the monetary transmission mechanism has to go beyond
consumption and include household portfolio balances. Changes in the
interest rate affect both the intertemporal substitution of consumption and
the portfolio composition between liquid nominal claims like government
bonds and illiquid real assets like capital. Demand for these different assets
translates differently into demand for goods. An increase in the interest rate
translates into a shortfall of spending only in so far as higher savings do not
increase investment one-for-one. Importantly, households differ enormously
in their wealth and portfolio composition. The fraction of savings going
into real assets increases in wealth.1 Therefore, monetary transmission
depends on both the distribution of the marginal propensities to consume
(MPC) and, via households’ portfolio choices, the marginal propensities to
invest (MPI), which together constitute a household’s marginal propensity
to spend an additional dollar on goods; see Figure 1.
Figure 1: Heterogeneity in propensities to consume and invest
(a) Marginal propensity to consume (b) Marginal propensity to invest
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Notes: Marginal propensities to spend an additional dollar on (a) consumption,
(b) investment (conditional on adjusting the overall portfolio). Policies by liquid
wealth percentile are estimated using a local linear regression technique with a
Gaussian kernel and a bandwidth of 0.1.
This paper assesses the importance of heterogeneity in propensities to
consume and invest for the transmission mechanism of monetary policy
in the context of a Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian (HANK) model
with asset-market incompleteness, idiosyncratic income risk, and sticky
1Stocks and businesses account for most of the wealth at the very top of the wealth
distribution, while households below median wealth hold a disproportionate share of
their wealth in very liquid form like cash and deposits; see Kuhn and Ríos-Rull (2013).
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prices. The key feature of the model is to allow for portfolio choice between
liquid and illiquid assets in a business-cycle framework. The illiquid asset
is real capital. It can only be traded with a certain probability each period
but pays a higher return than the liquid asset, which comprises nominal
government and household debt and can be traded without frictions. These
characteristics enable the model to endogenously generate the distribution
of portfolio shares and marginal propensities to consume across households
as documented for the United States.2
My first finding is that heterogeneity in household portfolios matters
for the aggregate effects of monetary policy. It does so via two chan-
nels: 1) On average, MPCs are higher and MPIs lower in comparison to
the representative agent version of the model because a sizable fraction
of households are liquidity constrained. This reduces the elasticity of in-
vestment to changes in the interest rate, while it increases the elasticity
of consumption. 2) Heterogeneity in MPCs and MPIs interacts with the
redistributive consequences of monetary policy and amplifies this change
in elasticities. Quantitatively, investment falls by 50% less in response to
a monetary tightening, while consumption falls by 17% more such that a
monetary shock moves output to a similar extent in the representative and
heterogeneous agent version of the model.
A monetary tightening increases income and wealth inequality.3 House-
holds at the top of the wealth distribution benefit from the revaluation of
nominal balances, i.e., the Fisher channel, and because a disproportion-
ate share of their income stems from profits, which increase while labor
income falls. Wealthy households primarily hold capital and, thus, have a
high marginal propensity to invest but low marginal propensity to consume.
Higher inequality thereby stabilizes investment after a contractionary mon-
etary policy shock but amplifies the drop in consumption.
Redistribution via the Fisher channel from unexpected inflation is quan-
titatively important. Its effect depends on the covariance between redistri-
bution and the marginal propensities to consume and invest. The distribu-
tion of marginal propensities to spend (MPI+MPC) determines the effect
on demand, while the distribution of MPIs matters for investment. I show
2For evidence on the distribution of MPCs, see the empirical literature on the con-
sumption response to transfers, e.g., Johnson et al. (2006), Parker et al. (2013), or Misra
and Surico (2014).
3This is in line with U.S. data. See Coibion et al. (2017), who find higher inequality
after contractionary monetary shocks.
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that propensities to invest are negatively correlated with inflation-induced
redistribution while propensities to spend are positively correlated. When
the economy is demand-driven, the Fisher channel amplifies the aggregate
effects of monetary shocks through heterogeneity in propensities to spend
by 20%. When prices are flexible, in contrast, the Fisher channel only works
through investment and leads to an expansion after a monetary tightening.
My second finding is that the monetary transmission mechanism is very
different from an economy with complete markets, in which current income
and redistribution do not matter. When the rate on liquid assets increases,
all else equal, all households optimally increase the liquidity of their port-
folios. In equilibrium, however, the monetary tightening causes income to
fall, and many households lower their liquid savings to smooth consump-
tion. Portfolio liquidity falls for households with below median wealth,
while it increases for wealthy households. For households at the borrowing
constraint, consumption falls one-to-one with income. The direct effect of
the interest rate cannot explain the sign change in portfolio responses, and
quantitatively explains only 20% of the total change in consumption, while
equilibrium effects account for the remaining 80%.
The importance of equilibrium effects contrasts sharply with the stan-
dard New Keynesian model that builds on a representative household. In
the latter, the direct effects of the interest rate explain close to all of the con-
sumption and investment response. Equilibrium effects are quantitatively
unimportant, because they exclusively work through changes in lifetime
income, and redistribution is non-existent.
This paper makes an empirical contribution as well. I provide novel
evidence for heterogeneity in portfolio responses to monetary shocks. I
regress repeated cross-sectional data on household portfolios from the Sur-
vey of Consumer Finances (SCF) on monetary policy shocks.4 Sorting
households according to percentiles of net wealth, I find that, when rates
increase, households below median wealth reduce their portfolio liquidity,
while households above median wealth increase portfolio liquidity.
The liquidity friction is key for the model to generate the differential
sign and magnitude of the estimated portfolio responses. I calibrate the
fraction of households trading capital each quarter to match the capital
4Wong (2015) and Cloyne et al. (2016) also look at the cross-sectional response to
monetary shocks. The first study analyzes the importance of age and the second the
importance of housing tenure for the consumption response to monetary shocks using
the Consumption Expenditure Survey.
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to government debt ratio in U.S. data. As I increase this fraction, fewer
households lower their liquid savings in response to a monetary tighten-
ing. When capital becomes perfectly liquid, all households increase their
portfolio liquidity, which is counterfactual, since 50% of households lower
portfolio liquidity in the data.
The ability of the two-asset model to match the differential portfolio re-
sponse provides new evidence for the importance of modeling illiquid assets
beyond “wealthy-hand-to-mouth” households, which matter for the distri-
bution of marginal propensities to consume (cf. Kaplan and Violante, 2014).
The two-asset model implies realistic distributions of marginal propensities
to consume and invest. Importantly, investment responds the most to mon-
etary shocks and, hence, understanding investment is key for the monetary
transmission.
My findings on the monetary transmission mechanism are complemen-
tary to the related work by Kaplan et al. (2018) (KMV). They also decom-
pose the effects of monetary policy into direct and equilibrium effects but
focus on the response of consumption to monetary shocks, while I study
consumption and investment. The key difference between both models is
the portfolio problem: KMV subsume capital and pure profits from mo-
nopolistic competition under illiquid assets, and assume that all dividends
and profits are paid into the illiquid account. The resulting investment
decision implies a counterfactual investment boom after a monetary tight-
ening. In my model, in contrast, aggregate investment follows q-theory.5 I
allocate profits to the top 1% of the income distribution, a group of house-
holds that are well-insured and approximately follow the permanent income
hypothesis. This has two advantages: 1) It fits the data on the distribu-
tion of income, 2) It does not imply counterfactual procyclical earnings
risk for 99% of the population, which would be the case when profits were
distributed lump-sum as is done in models with complete markets.
This paper also contributes to the assessment of the Fisher (1933) chan-
nel of unexpected inflation as a transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
Auclert (2015) studies this channel for the consumption response to mon-
etary shocks and derives a sufficient statistic that depends on the covari-
ance between MPCs and inflation-induced redistribution. In my two-asset
5Another advantage of random participation in the capital market is its transparency
and the ease of implementation, while still being consistent with micro and macro evi-
dence on portfolio allocations and liquidity premia.
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model, the Fisher channel works through marginal propensities to both
consume and invest, which are negatively correlated and hence potentially
cancel each other in terms of the effect on output.
My paper belongs to the recently evolving literature that incorporates
market incompleteness and idiosyncratic uncertainty into New Keynesian
models.6 As such, it builds on the New Keynesian literature with its focus
on nominal rigidities (cf. Christiano et al., 2005). What my paper and other
recent contributions add to this literature is the attempt to endogenize
heterogeneity in wealth.7 Relative to this literature, my paper provides
new evidence for the importance of modeling assets with different degrees
of liquidity and is the first to discuss the importance of heterogeneity in
propensities to invest for monetary policy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces
the model, and Section 2 discusses the solution method. Section 3 explains
the calibration of the model. Section 4 presents the quantitative results.
Section 5 presents the empirical evidence. Section 6 concludes.
1 Model
The model economy consists of households, firms, and a government. House-
holds consume, supply labor, obtain profit income, accumulate physical
capital, and trade in the bond market. Firms combine capital and labor
services to produce goods. The government issues bonds, raises taxes, and
purchases goods, while the monetary authority sets the nominal interest
rate on bonds. Let me describe each agent in turn.8
1.1 Households
There is a continuum of ex-ante identical households of measure one in-
dexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Households are infinitely lived, have time-separable
preferences with time-discount factor β, and derive felicity from consump-
tion cit and leisure. Households can be workers (hit > 0) or entrepreneurs
6See Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2017), Oh and Reis (2012), Gornemann et al. (2012),
Ravn and Sterk (2017), Den Haan et al. (2015), Auclert (2015), Bayer et al. (2015),
Werning (2015), McKay and Reis (2016), McKay et al. (2016), and Kaplan et al. (2018).
7Exogenous heterogeneity is well-established in New Keynesian models. See, for
example, Galí et al. (2007) and Bilbiie (2008).
8This model setup extends previous joint work (c.f. Bayer et al., 2015) and follows
the exposition where there is overlay.
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(hit = 0). Transition between both types is exogenous and stochastic,
but the fraction of households that are entrepreneurs at any given time
t = 0, 1, 2, ... is constant.9
Workers supply labor. Their labor income wthitnit is composed of
the wage rate, wt, hours worked, nit, and idiosyncratic labor productiv-
ity, hit, which evolves according to the following first-order autoregressive
process and a fixed probability of transition between the worker and the
entrepreneur state:
hit =

exp
(
ρh log hit−1 + hit
)
with probability 1− ζ if hit−1 6= 0,
1 with probability ι if hit−1 = 0,
0 else,
(1)
with hit ∼ N (0, σh). Entrepreneurs have zero productivity in the labor
market, but instead receive an equal share of the economy’s total profits
Πt.10 They pay the same tax rate as workers, τ .
Asset markets are incomplete. Households may only self-insure in nom-
inal bonds, b˜it, and in capital, kit. Holdings of capital have to be non-
negative, but households may issue nominal bonds up to an exogenously
specified limit b ∈ (−∞, 0]. Moreover, trading capital is subject to a fric-
tion.
This trading friction only allows a randomly selected fraction of house-
holds, ν, to participate in the market for capital each period. All other
households obtain dividends, but may only adjust their holdings of nom-
inal bonds. For those households participating in the capital market, the
budget constraint reads:
cit + bit+1 + qtkit+1 =
Rbt−1
pit
bit + (qt + rt)kit + (1− τ) [wthitNt + Ihit=0Πt] ,
kit+1 ≥ 0, bit+1 ≥ b, (2)
where bit is the real value of nominal bond holdings, kit are capital holdings,
9Fixed types of workers and entrepreneurs (or capitalists) without stochastic tran-
sitions can be found in Walsh (2014) or Broer et al. (2016), while Romei (2014) uses
stochastic transitions.
10Attaching the rents in the economy to an exogenously determined group of house-
holds instead of distributing them with the factor incomes for capital or labor has the
advantage that the factor prices and thus factor supply decisions remain the same as in
any standard New Keynesian framework.
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qt is the price of capital, rt is the rental rate or “dividend,” Rbt−1 is the gross
nominal return on bonds, and pit = PtPt−1 is the inflation rate. I denote real
bond holdings of household i at the end of period t by bit+1 := b˜it+1Pt . There
is a wasted intermediation cost, R, when households resort to unsecured
borrowing. Therefore, Rb has two parts:
Rbt−1(bit, RBt−1) =
R
B
t−1 if bit ≥ 0
RBt−1 +R if bit < 0.
(3)
This assumption creates a mass of households with zero unsecured credit
but with the possibility to borrow, though at a penalty rate.
For those households that cannot trade in the market for capital the
budget constraint simplifies to:
cit + bit+1 =
Rbt−1
pit
bit + rtkit + (1− τ) [wthitNt + Ihit=0Πt] ,
bit+1 ≥ b. (4)
Note that I assume that the depreciation of capital is replaced through
maintenance such that the dividend, rt, is the net return on capital.
Households have GHH preferences (cf. Greenwood et al., 1988) and
maximize the discounted sum of felicity:
V = E0 max{cit,nit}
∞∑
t=0
βtu (xit) , (5)
where xit = cit−hitG(nit) is household i’s composite demand for the phys-
ical consumption good cit and leisure.
The disutility of work, hitG(nit), determines a workers’ labor supply
given the aggregate wage rate through the first-order condition:
hitG
′(nit) = (1− τ)wthit. (6)
Under the above assumption, a worker’s labor decision does not respond to
idiosyncratic productivity hit, but only to the net aggregate wage (1−τ)wt.
Thus I can drop the household-specific index i, and set nit = Nt.11
11For the purposes of this paper, GHH preferences and the specific form of the disutil-
ity of labor adopted are helpful. They rule out wealth effects on labor supply and more
generally make labor supply independent of all idiosyncratic states. As a result, labor
supply only depends on the aggregate wage rate, as it does for the representative house-
7
The Frisch elasticity of aggregate labor supply is constant with γ being
the inverse elasticity:
G(Nt) =
1
1 + γN
1+γ
t , γ > 0.
Exploiting the first-order condition on labor supply, the disutility of work-
ing can be expressed in terms of the net wage rate:
hitG(Nt) = hit
N1+γt
1 + γ =
hitG
′(Nt)Nt
1 + γ =
(1− τ)wthitNt
1 + γ .
In this way the demand for xit can be rewritten as:
xit = cit − hitG(Nt) = cit − (1− τ)wthitNt1 + γ .
The budget constraint and the households’ planning problem can therefore
be expressed in terms of composite good xit.
A household’s optimal consumption-savings decision is a non-linear
function of that household’s asset portfolio {bit, kit} and productivity {hit}.
Accordingly, the price level Pt and aggregate real bonds Bt+1 = B˜t+1Pt are
functions of the joint distribution Θt over idiosyncratic states (bt, kt, ht).
This makes the distribution Θt a state variable of the households’ planning
problem. The distribution Θt fluctuates in response to aggregate monetary
or total factor productivity shocks. Let Ω stand in for aggregate shocks.
With this setup, two Bellman equations characterize the dynamic plan-
ning problem of a household: Va in the case where the household can adjust
its capital holdings and Vn otherwise:
Va(b, k, h; Θ,Ω) = max
k′,b′a
u[c(b, b′a, k, k′, h)] + β[νEV a(b′a, k′, h′,Θ′,Ω′)
+ (1− ν)EV n(b′a, k′, h′,Θ′,Ω′)]
Vn(b, k, h; Θ,Ω) = max
b′n
u[c(b, b′n, k, k, h)] + β[νEV a(b′n, k, h′,Θ′,Ω′)
+ (1− ν)EV n(b′n, k, h′,Θ′,Ω′)] (7)
In line with this notation, I define the optimal consumption policies for
the adjustment and non-adjustment cases as c∗a and c∗n, the nominal bond
hold. I thereby isolate the effect of heterogeneity in portfolio responses to monetary
shocks.
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holding policies as b∗a and b∗n, and the capital investment policy as k∗. See
Appendix A for the first-order conditions.
1.2 Intermediate Good Producer
Intermediate goods are produced with a constant returns to scale produc-
tion function:
Yt = ZtNαt K
(1−α)
t ,
where Zt is total factor productivity (TFP). It follows a first-order autore-
gressive process:
logZt = ρZ logZt−1 + Zt , Zt ∼ N (0, σZ) . (8)
Let MCt be the relative price at which the intermediate good is sold to
resellers. The intermediate-good producer maximizes profits,
MCtZtN
α
t K
(1−α)
t − wtNt − (rt + δ)Kt,
and faces perfectly competitive markets such that the real wage and the
user costs of capital are given by the marginal products of labor and capital:
wt = αMCtZt (Kt/Nt)1−α , (9)
rt + δ = (1− α)MCtZt (Nt/Kt)α . (10)
1.3 Resellers
Resellers differentiate the intermediate good and set prices. I assume price
adjustment costs à la Rotemberg (1982). For tractability, I assume that
price setting is delegated to a mass-zero group of households (managers)
that are risk neutral and compensated by a share in profits. They do not
participate in any asset market. Under this assumption, price setting is
carried out with a time-constant discount factor. Managers maximize the
present value of real profits given the demand for good j,
yjt = (pjt/Pt)−η Yt, (11)
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and quadratic costs of price adjustment, i.e., they maximize:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtYt

(
pjt
Pt
−MCt
)(
pjt
Pt
)−η
− η2κ
(
log pjt
pjt−1
)2 . (12)
From the corresponding first-order condition for price setting, it is
straightforward to derive the Phillips curve:
log(pit) = βEt
[
log(pit+1)Yt+1Yt
]
+ κ
(
MCt − η−1η
)
, (13)
where pit is the gross inflation rate, pit := PtPt−1 , and MCt are the real
marginal costs. The price adjustment then creates real costs η2κYt log(pit)
2.
Since managers are a measure-zero group in the economy, all prof-
its – net of price adjustment costs – go to the entrepreneur-households.
In addition, these households also obtain profit income from adjusting the
aggregate capital stock. They can transform It consumption goods into
∆Kt+1 capital goods (and back) according to the transformation function:
It = φ2 (∆Kt+1/Kt)
2Kt + ∆Kt+1.
Since they are facing perfect competition in this market, entrepreneurs will
adjust the stock of capital until the following first-order condition holds:
qt = 1 + φ∆Kt+1/Kt. (14)
1.4 Final Good Producer
Perfectly competitive final good producers use differentiated goods as input
taking input and sell price as given. Final goods are used for consumption
and investment. The problem of the representative final good producer is
as follows:
max
Yt,yjt∈[0,1]
PtYt −
∫ 1
0
pjtyjtdj (15)
s.t. : Yt =
(∫ 1
0
y
η−1
η
jt dj
) η
η−1
,
where yjt is the quantity of differentiated good j demanded as input.
From the zero-profit condition, the price of the final good is given by Pt =(∫ 1
0 p
1−η
jt dj
) 1
1−η .
10
1.5 Central Bank and Government
Monetary policy sets the gross nominal interest rate, RBt , according to a
Taylor (1993)-type rule that reacts to deviations of inflation from target
and exhibits interest rate smoothing:
RBt+1
R¯B
=
(
RBt
R¯B
)ρR (pit
p¯i
)(1−ρR)θpi
Rt , (16)
where log Rt ∼ N (0, σR) are monetary policy shocks. All else equal, the
central bank raises the nominal rate above its steady-state value RB when-
ever inflation exceeds its target value.12 The parameter ρR captures “in-
trinsic policy inertia.”
The fiscal authority decides on government spending, Gt, raises tax
revenues, Tt, and issues nominal bonds. Let Bt+1 denote their time t real
value. The government budget constraint reads: Bt+1 =
RBt−1
pit
Bit +Gt− Tt,
where real tax revenues are given by Tt = τ [NtWt + Πt]. I assume that the
government issues bonds according to the rule (c.f. Woodford, 1995):
Bt+1
B¯
=
(
BtR
B
t /pit
B¯R¯B/p¯i
)ρB
. (17)
The coefficient ρB captures whether and how fast the government seeks
to repay its outstanding obligations BtRBt /pit. For ρB < 1 the government
actively stabilizes real government debt via adjusting government spending,
and for ρB = 1 the government rolls over all outstanding debt including
interest.13
1.6 Market Clearing Conditions
The labor market clears at the competitive wage given in (9); so does the
market for capital services if (10) holds. The nominal bond market clears
12Note that determinacy of the price level in this model does not depend on the Taylor
principle θpi > 1. The economy is non-Ricardian because households value government
debt for its consumption-smoothing services. Hence, the standard Taylor principle does
not apply here; see Hagedorn (2018).
13Adjustment via government spending is the baseline formulation because changing
taxes would directly redistribute across households. This also applies to lump-sum taxes
in this environment. See Appendix F.5 for robustness to different fiscal rules.
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whenever the following equation holds:
Bt+1 =
∫
[νb∗a(b, k, h) + (1− ν)b∗n(b, k, h)] Θt(b, k, h)dbdkdh. (18)
Last, the market for capital has to clear:
qt = 1 + φ
Kt+1 −Kt
Kt
, (19)
Kt+1 =
∫
[νk∗(b, k, h) + (1− ν)k(b, k, h)] Θt(b, k, h)dbdkdh,
where the first equation stems from competition in the production of capital
goods, and the second equation defines the aggregate supply of funds from
households. The goods market then clears due to Walras’ law, whenever
labor, bond, and capital markets clear.
1.7 Recursive Equilibrium
A recursive equilibrium is a set of policy functions {c∗a, c∗n, b∗a, b∗n, k∗}, value
functions {Va, Vn}, pricing functions {r, RB, w, pi, q}, aggregate bonds, cap-
ital, and labor supply functions {B,K,N}, distributions Θt over individual
asset holdings and productivity, and a perceived law of motion Γ, such that
1. Given Va, Vn, Γ, prices, and distributions, the policy functions solve
the households’ planning problem, and given prices, distributions,
and the policy functions, the value functions {Va, Vn} are a solution
to the Bellman equations (7).
2. The labor, the final-goods, the bond, the capital, and the intermediate-
goods markets clear, i.e., (9), (13), (18), and (19) hold.
3. The actual law of motion and the perceived law of motion Γ coincide,
i.e., Θ′ = Γ(Θ,Ω′).
2 Numerical Implementation
The dynamic program (7) and hence the recursive equilibrium are not com-
putable, because it involves the infinite dimensional object Θt. I discretize
the distribution Θt and represent it by its histogram, a finite dimensional
object.
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2.1 Solving the Households’ Planning Problem
I solve for the households’ policy functions by applying an endogenous grid
point method as originally developed in Carroll (2006) and extended by
Hintermaier and Koeniger (2010), iterating over the first-order conditions.
I approximate the idiosyncratic productivity process by a discrete Markov
chain with 4 states, using the method proposed by Tauchen (1986). I solve
the household policies for 150 points on a log-grid for bonds and for capital.
2.2 Aggregate Fluctuations
I solve for aggregate dynamics by first-order perturbation around the sta-
tionary equilibrium without aggregate shocks as in Reiter (2009). To re-
duce the dimensionality of the problem I follow Bayer et al. (2015) and
approximate the three-dimensional distribution Θt by a distribution that
has a fixed copula and time-varying marginals and the value function and
its derivatives by a sparse polynomial around their stationary equilibrium
solutions. Appendix B provides more details on the algorithm and its nu-
merical accuracy.
3 Calibration
I calibrate the model to the U.S. economy over the time period 1983Q1
to 2007Q4, since I focus on conventional monetary policy. One period in
the model is a quarter. Table 1 shows the targeted moments of the wealth
distribution, and Table 2 summarizes the calibration. In detail, I choose the
parameter values as follows, with all parameters reported for the quarterly
frequency of the model.
3.1 Households
I assume that the felicity function is of constant-relative-risk-aversion form:
u(x) = 11−ξx
1−ξ, where ξ = 4, as in Kaplan and Violante (2014). The
inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply is 0.75, in line with estimates by
Chetty et al. (2011). The time-discount factor, β = 0.98, and the capital
market participation frequency, ν = 0.065, are jointly calibrated to match
13
Table 1: Targeted moments of the wealth distribution
Targets Model Data Source Parameter
Mean illiquid assets (K/Y) 2.86 2.86 NIPA Discount factor
Mean liquidity (B/K) 0.09 0.09 SCF Participation frequency
Gini total wealth 0.78 0.78 SCF Fraction of entrepreneurs
Fraction borrowers 0.16 0.16 SCF Borrowing penalty
the ratio of capital and government bonds to output.14 I equate capital to
all capital goods relative to nominal GDP. The annual capital-to-output
ratio is therefore 286%. This implies an annual real return on capital of
about 4.5%. I equate government bonds to the outstanding government
debt held by private domestic agents, which implies an annual bonds-to-
capital ratio of 9%.
I set the borrowing limit in bonds, b, to half of the average quarterly
income and choose the penalty rate for unsecured borrowing, R¯, such that
16% of households have negative net nominal positions as in the Survey of
Consumer Finances 1983-2007.15
I calibrate the transitions in and out of the entrepreneur state to capture
the distribution of wealth in the U.S. economy. For simplicity, I assume
that the probability of becoming an entrepreneur is the same for workers
independent of their labor productivity and that, once they become workers
again, they start with median productivity. I calibrate the probability of
leaving the entrepreneurial state to 1/16 per quarter following the numbers
that Guvenen et al. (2014) report on the probability of dropping out of the
top 1% income group in the U.S. (see their Table 2, roughly 25% p.a.). In
order to match a wealth Gini index of 0.78, this implies that roughly 1%
of households are entrepreneurs.16
I set the quarterly standard deviation of persistent shocks to idiosyn-
cratic labor productivity to 0.06 and the quarterly autocorrelation to 0.98
14The participation frequency of 6.5% per quarter is higher than in the optimal partic-
ipation framework of Kaplan and Violante (2014). They find a participation frequency
of 4.5% for working households given a fixed-adjustment cost of $500.
15Appendix C.2 provides a more detailed discussion of the cross-sectional data.
16This mimics the U.S. income distribution. According to the Congressional Budget
Office, the top 1% of the income distribution receives about 30% of their income from
financial income, a much larger share than any other segment of the population.
14
– both standard values in the literature (c.f. Storesletten et al., 2004).
3.2 Production Sectors
The labor and capital share including profits (2/3 and 1/3) align with long-
run U.S. averages. The persistence of the TFP shock is set to ρZ = 0.9.
The standard deviation of the TFP shock, σZ = 0.007, is calibrated to
make the model match the standard deviation of H-P-filtered U.S. output.
To calibrate the parameters of the resellers’ problem, I use standard
values for markup and price stickiness that are widely employed in the
New Keynesian literature (c.f. Christiano et al., 1999). The Phillips curve
parameter κ implies an average price duration of 4 quarters, assuming
flexible capital at the firm level. The steady-state marginal costs, η−1
η
=
0.95, imply a markup of 5%. I calibrate the adjustment cost of capital,
φ = 8.5, to match a relative investment volatility of 3 in response to TFP
shocks – a standard value for U.S. data.
3.3 Central Bank and Government
I set the inflation rate to zero and the real return on bonds to 2.5% in line
with the average federal funds rate in the U.S. in real terms from 1983 to
2007. Clarida et al. (2000) provide an estimate for the parameter govern-
ing interest rate smoothing, ρR = 0.8, while the central bank’s reaction
to deviations of inflation from target is standard, θpi = 1.5. The standard
deviation of the monetary policy shock, σD, is 36 basis points annualized,
which corresponds to the average quarterly shock as identified by the nar-
rative approach (c.f. Wieland and Yang, 2016).
The government levies a proportional tax on labor income and profits
to finance government spending and interest expense on debt. A tax rate
of τ = 0.3 closes the budget constraint given the interest expense and a
government-spending-to-GDP ratio of 20% in the steady state. Govern-
ment spending, in turn, follows a fiscal rule similar to Woodford (1995)
or Bi et al. (2013). Specifically, I set ρB = 0.98 so that most of the ad-
justment goes through government debt and future government spending
adjusts to bring debt back to its steady-state value. Appendix F.5 provides
robustness checks.
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Table 2: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Value Description Target
Households
β 0.98 Discount factor see Table 1
ν 6.5% Participation frequency see Table 1
ξ 4 Relative risk aversion Kaplan and Violante (2014)
γ 0.75 Inv. Frisch elasticity Chetty et al. (2011)
R 11% Borrowing penalty see Table 1
ρh 0.98 Persistence of productivity Standard value
σh 0.06 STD of innovations Standard value
Intermediate Goods
α 70% Share of labor Income share labor of 66%
δ 1.35% Depreciation rate NIPA: Fixed assets
ρZ 0.9 Persistence of TFP shock Standard value
σZ 0.007 STD of TFP shock Volatility of output
Final Goods
κ 0.09 Price stickiness 4 quarters
η 20 Elasticity of substitution 5% markup
Capital Goods
φ 8.5 Capital adjustment costs STD(I)/STD(Y )=3
Fiscal Policy
τ 0.3 Tax rate G/Y = 20%
ρB 0.98 Reaction to debt Autocorrelation of debt
Monetary Policy
Π 1 Inflation 0% p.a.
RB 1.0062 Nominal interest rate 2.5% p.a.
θpi 1.5 Reaction to inflation Standard value
ρR 0.8 Interest rate smoothing Clarida et al. (2000)
σR 9e-4 STD of monetary shock Wieland and Yang (2016)
Notes: All values are reported for the quarterly frequency of the model.
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4 Results
I first consider the theoretical channels through which monetary policy di-
rectly and indirectly affects household decisions in this model. I quantify
the direct effect of changes in the interest rate on household consumption
and portfolio decisions by solving for individual optimal decisions keeping
all other prices and quantities constant. Comparing the direct responses
to the change of consumption and portfolios in equilibrium reveals the im-
portance of “indirect” equilibrium changes in prices and income. I then
compare the aggregate effects on the economy with heterogeneity in house-
hold portfolios to the same economy with a representative household and
discuss the importance of heterogeneity in household portfolios for aggre-
gate outcomes.17
4.1 Transmission Channels of Monetary Policy
Key for understanding the transmission of monetary policy in any DSGE
model is the household consumption-savings decision. The decision prob-
lem of households in an incomplete-markets setting differs from that of a
representative household because borrowing constraints bind for a fraction
of households and the marginal value of liquid assets differs across house-
holds. The effect of monetary policy on household decisions, in turn, can
be split into direct and indirect effects.
Consider a contractionary monetary policy shock. All else equal, an
increase in the nominal interest rate also increases the real return on liquid
assets and, thus, the intertemporal relative price of composite consumption
of leisure and goods, Xt, today vs. tomorrow.18 At the same time, a higher
return on liquid assets induces households to rebalance their portfolios
towards the liquid asset – reducing savings in illiquid capital. Moreover,
higher interest payments on liquid assets imply an income effect that is
17The representative household version of the model does not feature limited partic-
ipation in the capital market because households are perfectly insured through state-
contingent claims. I keep the parameters of the model unchanged to isolate the effect
of heterogeneity in household portfolios on the transmission of monetary policy.
18Recall that the household problem can be expressed in terms of composite consump-
tion Xt with GHH preferences: xit = cit− (1−τ)wthitNt1+γ . It is therefore the intertemporal
allocation of composite consumption that matters for the household in this model.
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Figure 2: Partial equilibrium – Individual response to a monetary shock
(a) Consumption response ∆ log cit (b) Portfolio liquidity ∆(bit/kit)
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(c) Bond response ∆ log bit (d) Capital response ∆ log kit
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Response of individual consumption and asset demand policies at constant
prices and quantities to a 1 standard deviation monetary shock, R = 36 basis
points (annualized). Policies by wealth percentile are estimated using a local
linear regression technique with a Gaussian kernel and a bandwidth of 0.1.
Asset demand policies start at the 11th percentile because poorer households
hold negative liquid wealth.
positive or negative depending on a household’s net liquid asset position.
I refer to the effects of the interest rate change as the direct channel of
monetary policy.
Figure 2 shows the individually optimal response across the wealth dis-
tribution to an increase in the interest rate by 36 basis points annualized
(reverting back according to the inertia in the Taylor rule, ρR = 0.8) – keep-
ing all other prices and quantities fixed. Consumption falls the most for
households with below median wealth. Consumption of wealthy households
falls by markedly less because of a positive income effect. All households
increase the liquidity of their portfolios, and, if possible, sell illiquid capital
to buy liquid bonds. The rebalancing is strongest for households in the
18
Figure 3: Portfolio response, ∆(bit/kit), to a monetary shock in equilibrium
(a) Model (b) Data
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Change in portfolio liquidity after a 1 standard deviation monetary shock,
R = 36 basis points (annualized), after 2 years. Policies by wealth percentile
are estimated using a local linear regression technique with a Gaussian kernel
and a bandwidth of 0.1. Data correspond to the local projection with SCF
data as in Section 5 at a horizon of 2 years. Bootstrapped 90% confidence
bands are shown in the dashed lines, based on a non-parametric bootstrap.
Plotted from the 11th percentile onwards because poorer households hold
negative liquid wealth.
bottom of the wealth distribution.
Since prices are sticky, the decrease in consumption and investment is
not completely offset by lower prices, and output falls. Lower output, in
turn, decreases income, consumption and investment, which again reduces
income and so forth. I refer to the equilibrium changes in income and prices
as the indirect effects of monetary policy.
In the complete markets economy, these indirect effects matter for com-
posite consumption only in so far as they change lifetime income, because
the consumption path is determined by a sequence of Euler equations and
a single lifetime budget constraint. The consumption of final goods, Ct,
and labor supply, Nt, then follows through the intratemporal consumption-
leisure trade-off that solely depends on the wage rate. With incomplete
markets, however, current income becomes an important determinant of
composite and final-goods consumption because of borrowing constraints.
The quantitative importance of indirect effects becomes apparent in
Figure 3. Panel (a) shows the portfolio response 8 quarters after a mon-
19
etary tightening (by 36 basis points annualized) in equilibrium. In con-
trast to Figure 2, portfolio liquidity falls for the majority of households,
although the return on liquid assets is higher. Only households in the
top 30% of the wealth distribution increase their portfolio liquidity. These
households are well-insured, while wealth-poor households use their liquid
savings to smooth consumption. The heterogeneity in household portfo-
lio responses matches the empirical estimates of the portfolio response to
monetary shocks from the Survey of Consumer Finances; see Panel (b).
Section 5 discusses the empirical results in more detail. The next section
first describes the aggregate effects of monetary shocks in the model with
and without complete markets, and then elaborates on the importance of
heterogeneous household responses.
4.2 Equilibrium Effects of a Monetary Policy Shock
As before, I consider the effect of a monetary surprise that, all else equal,
would increase the nominal interest rate on liquid assets by 1 standard
deviation, i.e., 36 basis points (annualized), in period 1. Figure 4 compares
the responses of the economy with and without heterogeneity in household
portfolios.
What stands out immediately is that the output response is almost
identical. The initial drop in output is about 0.8% in both versions of
the model. The composition of the output drop, however, is quite differ-
ent. The fall in consumption is steeper in the economy with heterogeneous
households, while the reverse is true for investment. Consumption falls by
17% more and the total consumption loss over 4 years is 0.35 percentage
point higher with incomplete markets. Investment, however, falls by 50%
less when markets are incomplete, which leaves the output response the
same.19
Looking at composite consumption Xt, which abstracts from the inter-
action between wage rate and consumption inherent in GHH preferences,
makes the difference between both economies even more evident.20 Com-
posite consumption falls in equilibrium five times more when current in-
19The finding of a lower elasticity of investment to monetary shocks is robust to
the assumptions on fiscal policy, allocation of profits, and aggregate capital adjustment
costs; see Appendix F.
20More leisure time decreases the marginal utility of consumption with GHH prefer-
ences such that, all else equal, consumption falls with labor supply Nt.
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Figure 4: Aggregate response to a monetary shock
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Notes: Impulse responses to a 1 standard deviation monetary policy shock,
R = 36 basis points (annualized). Solid line: the model with heterogeneous
households. Dashed line: same calibration with a representative household.
All rates (dividends, interest, liquidity premium) are not annualized. *LP =
Etqt+1+rt
qt
− RBtEtpit+1 **Xt =
∫
(cit − hit n
1+γ
it
1+γ )di
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Table 3: Exposure to monetary shocks by wealth holdings
Income gains/losses Capital gains/losses
Wealth Interest Dividends Labor/Profit on real assets
quintiles ∆(RBt−1/pit) ∆rt ∆(WtNt + Πt) ∆qt
1. -0.03 -0.05 -6.53 -0.05
2. 0.25 -0.16 -6.12 -0.27
3. 0.35 -0.36 -5.51 -0.62
4. 0.37 -1.17 -1.99 -2.03
5. 0.44 -2.49 1.61 -4.33
Notes: On impact gains and losses in percent of within group consumption after
a 1 standard deviation monetary policy shock, D = 36 basis points (annualized).
Results are expressed in terms of steady-state consumption and averaged by
using frequency weights from the steady-state wealth distribution.
come, and not lifetime income, is the relevant constraint, and stays subdued
for 16 quarters. The indirect effects through the lifetime budget constraint
are of minor importance, and composite consumption is determined by the
path of the real rate when markets are complete. Current income, however,
responds strongly and so does composite consumption when borrowing con-
straints bind. Quantitatively, indirect effects explain 80% of the drop in
composite consumption with market incompleteness, while the direct effect
through interest rate changes accounts for only 20%; compare Figure 4 to
Figure 2.21
The most important indirect effect comes from the fall in labor income.
Wages fall to a similar extent as consumption; see Figure 4. Table 3 sum-
marizes the gains and losses on each source of income. They are reported
relative to the average consumption of each wealth bracket. Labor income
for households below median wealth falls by more than 6% of consump-
tion, while households in the top quintile of the wealth distribution enjoy
higher returns on their human capital on average because an dispropor-
tionate share are entrepreneurs. They receive profit income that increases
while labor income falls.22 The top quintile incurs the highest losses on the
21Looking at consumption of final goods, indirect effects explain about 95% of the
total response because of GHH preferences. The GHH effect, however, is also present in
the complete-markets setting. It accounts for about 90% of the response in consumption
of final goods there. This is driven by the adopted preference specification and vanishes
with additively separable preferences in consumption and leisure.
22The results are qualitatively robust to allocating profits lump-sum; see Appendix
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Figure 5: Marginal propensities to consume and invest
(a) MPC (b) MPI
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(c) MPC+MPI (MPS) (d) MPC, MPI, and MPS
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Marginal propensities to spend an additional dollar on (a) consumption, (b)
investment, and (c) consumption plus investment for households that can
and cannot adjust their illiquid asset position. Panel (d) shows all three
propensities (MPC, MPI, MPS) for all households combined. Policies by
liquid wealth percentile are estimated using a local linear regression technique
with a Gaussian kernel and a bandwidth of 0.1.
real asset position. However, most of it is caused by lower asset prices that
are not completely realized.
The Fisher channel is important as well. Surprise deflation redistributes
from borrowers to savers; see the column labeled ‘Interest’ in Table 3. On
average, borrowers have higher marginal propensities to consume but lower
marginal propensities to invest than savers. Figure 5 plots these marginal
propensities for each percentile of the liquid wealth distribution. House-
holds close to the borrowing constraint have the highest marginal propen-
sity to consume, around 25%, but the fraction of an additional dollar that
goes into investment is less then 5%. Households above median wealth, in
contrast, invest twice as much of any additional dollar. The sum of both the
F.3.
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marginal propensities to consume and invest yields the marginal propen-
sity to spend an additional dollar on goods, which matters for the effect
of redistribution on aggregate demand. Panel (d) shows that the marginal
propensity to spend is higher for borrowers than savers. Hence, the Fisher
channel amplifies the aggregate effects of monetary policy through aggre-
gate demand.
I quantify the Fisher channel by solving a version of the model with
real debt, in which inflation-induced redistribution is absent, and find that
aggregates fall by roughly 20% more in the baseline model with nominal
debt (Y by 23% more, C by 22% more, I by 25% more). This amplification
of the recessionary effects of a monetary tightening depends on prices be-
ing sticky. When prices are flexible, heterogeneity in propensities to spend
does not matter because any shortfall in spending is offset by firms lower-
ing prices. Only heterogeneity in the marginal propensity to invest matters
in this case because it affects the future capital stock. For this reason, a
monetary tightening leads to a boom with flexible prices as inflation redis-
tributes from borrowers with low to savers with high marginal propensities
to invest.23
The heterogeneity in the marginal propensity to invest is key for un-
derstanding the substantially smaller investment response in the full model
with heterogeneity in household portfolios in comparison to the model with
complete markets.24 A tightening of monetary conditions increases inequal-
ity because it redistributes from borrowers to savers and from households
that earn wage income to those that earn profit income. Both channels
transfer from the bottom to the top of the wealth distribution and hence
increase inequality.25 Wealthy households have a higher marginal propen-
sity to invest and, thus, stabilize investment demand as they get richer
through redistribution.
Figure 6 displays the equilibrium response of household portfolios and
consumption to the monetary shock across the wealth distribution on im-
pact. All households that can adjust portfolios sell capital, but capital
holdings fall the most for households with below median wealth. Adjusters
increase the liquidity of their portfolios, with the highest increase at the
20th percentile of the wealth distribution. The dashed line in Panel (b),
23See Appendix F.4 for more details.
24See Appendix F.1 for the investment response with liquid capital and constant MPIs.
25See Appendix E for the response of the Ginis of consumption, income, and wealth.
These findings mirror recent empirical evidence by Coibion et al. (2017).
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Figure 6: Consumption and portfolio response to a monetary shock
(a) Consumption response ∆ log cit (b) Portfolio liquidity ∆(bit/kit)
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(c) Bond response ∆ log bit (d) Capital response ∆ log kit
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On impact equilibrium response of individual consumption and asset demand
policies for households that can and cannot adjust their illiquid asset position
to a 1 standard deviation monetary shock, R = 36 basis points (annualized).
Policies by wealth percentile are estimated using a local linear regression tech-
nique with a Gaussian kernel and a bandwidth of 0.1. Asset demand policies
start at the 11th percentile because poorer households hold negative liquid
wealth.
however, reveals that portfolio liquidity falls for a large fraction of house-
holds that cannot adjust their portfolios. Liquid bond holdings fall the
most, about -8%, for wealth-poor households who see the largest decline in
consumption as well. Combining adjusters and non-adjusters, the liquidity
ratio falls for households with below median wealth.
To generate this sign difference in the portfolio response to monetary
shocks, the liquidity friction and sizable indirect effects through the period
budget constraint are key. In partial equilibrium, when only the return
on liquid assets increases, all households increase portfolio liquidity; see
Figure 2. In equilibrium, when current income falls, most households use
their liquid savings to smooth consumption. This holds true even for longer
25
Figure 7: Portfolio response counterfactuals
(a) ∆(bit/kit) (b) ∆(bit/kit) (c) ∆(Bt/Kt)
when ν = 0.25 when ν = 0.5 when ν = 1
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Notes: Panels (a) and (b) show the change in portfolio liquidity after a 1
standard deviation monetary shock, R = 36 basis points (annualized), after
2 years with (a) a 25% and (b) a 50% chance of trading capital in a given
period. Policies by wealth percentile are estimated using a local linear regression
technique with a Gaussian kernel and a bandwidth of 0.1. Panel (c) shows the
impulse response function of Bt/Kt in the case of perfectly liquid capital.
time horizons when more households can adjust their portfolios. In Figure
3, which plots the response of portfolios after 8 quarters, the magnitude
of portfolio differences between wealthy and poor households is even more
pronounced.
A model with liquid capital, in contrast, implies a counterfactual in-
crease in the portfolio liquidity of all households. Figure 7 shows coun-
terfactuals for three versions of the model: (a) 25% of households trade
capital each period, (b) 50% of households trade each period, (c) all house-
holds trade each period. As capital becomes more liquid, fewer households
lower their portfolio liquidity and the magnitude of the portfolio response
becomes substantially smaller. When capital and bonds are perfect substi-
tutes, the individual portfolio problem is indeterminate. Aggregate liquid-
ity, Bt/Kt, follows from the arbitrage condition between both assets and
the government supply of bonds. Assuming that households hold the av-
erage portfolio, portfolio liquidity increases by 0.2 percentage point for all
households in the first quarter after the monetary tightening.26
26See Appendix F.1 for more details on the model with liquid capital.
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5 Empirical Evidence
Monetary policy shocks provide an important validation exercise for macroe-
conomic models (cf. Ramey, 2016). In this section, I extend this exercise
beyond aggregate time series to cross-sectional data on household portfolios
to provide evidence for heterogeneity in the response to monetary shocks
across households with different wealth.
To that end, I first estimate the effect of monetary policy shocks on
aggregate economic activity, average household portfolios from the Flow of
Funds, and a measure of the liquidity premium. I then use cross-sectional
information on household portfolios from the Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF). I find that wealthy households drive the increase in average liquidity,
whereas poorer households see a substantial fall in portfolio liquidity in line
with the model.
5.1 Aggregate Response to Monetary Shocks
Figure 8 shows the response of aggregate variables to a surprise increase
in the federal funds rate. I estimate the responses by local projections
with monetary shocks identified by the narrative approach (cf. Romer and
Romer, 2004):27
Υt+j = βj,0 + βj,1t+ βj,2¯Rt + βj,3Xt−1 + νt+j, j = 0...15, (20)
where ¯Rt are monetary shocks with a normalized standard deviation of 1,
Xt = [Yt, Ct, It, RBt , Rt , Rt−1] are aggregate controls and lagged monetary
shocks, and Υt+j is the endogenous variable of interest at horizon j. I use
quarterly data from 1983 to 2007.28 See Appendix D for more details.
I consider a 1 standard deviation monetary shock (36 basis points annu-
alized) that pushes up the federal funds rate for 3 years. In response, output
falls by roughly 0.6% after 3 years and recovers only slowly. Consumption
falls slightly less than output with a similar dynamic. Investment falls too,
but its reaction is roughly three times as strong as the output reaction.
The decline in investment finds its reflection in household balance sheets.
The ratio of liquid-to-illiquid assets goes up after a monetary tightening;
27I use the updated shock series by Wieland and Yang (2016).
28I focus on the time after the Volcker disinflation and before the Great Recession for
two reasons. First, the SCF is only available from 1983 onwards and monetary shocks
only up to 2007. Second, this period is less likely to feature structural breaks.
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Figure 8: Aggregate response to a monetary shock
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Estimated response of each time series at t+ j, j = 1 . . . 16 to a monetary policy
shock, Rt = 36 basis points, where t corresponds to quarters from 1983Q1 to
2007Q4. The regressions control for the lagged state of the economyXt−1, where
Xt = [Yt, Ct, It, RBt , Rt , Rt−1]. Bootstrapped 90% confidence bands are shown in
the dashed lines (block bootstrap). * Liquidity premium is proxied by realized
return on housing (rent-price ratio in t plus realized growth rate of house prices
in t+ 1) relative to the federal funds rate.
see lower middle panel of Figure 8. I calculate this ratio from the Flow of
Funds (Table Z1-B.101) by defining liquid assets as all deposits, cash, debt
securities (including government bonds), and loans held directly, while I
treat all other real and financial assets as illiquid.29 While average liq-
uidity goes up by around 2%, the liquidity premium falls by 2 percentage
points. I proxy the liquidity premium by the realized return on housing
(rent-price ratio in t plus realized growth rate of house prices in t + 1)
29Kaplan et al. (2018) adopt a very similar asset taxonomy. The reason to treat
equities as illiquid is that most equities are held in the form of pension funds. Equity
shares held directly only play a role above the 85th wealth percentile. Publicly traded
equities that a single household can sell without price impact play a significant role
in household portfolios only for a relatively small fraction of households and a small
fraction of the aggregate capital stock.
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relative to the federal funds rate.30
The next section shows that behind the increase in average liquidity lies
large heterogeneity in household responses.
5.2 Household Response to Monetary Shocks
In the following, I estimate the response of household portfolios to mone-
tary policy shocks. I order households by their net wealth and document
heterogeneity in the response of portfolio liquidity across the wealth distri-
bution.
Using the Survey of Consumer Finances, I estimate the liquidity ratio
λLI(prc,t)
λIL(prc,t) by each percentile, prc, of net wealth for each SCF survey year t
from 1983 to 2007. The definition of net liquid wealth corresponds to the
Flow of Funds data, i.e., net liquid assets include all savings and checking
accounts, call and money market accounts, certificates of deposit, all types
of bonds, and private loans net of credit card debt. All other assets are
considered illiquid. Appendix C.2 discusses the asset classification and the
construction of the liquidity ratios in more detail.
I regress these portfolio measures for each percentile of wealth on annual
monetary shocks, γ2(prc), including an intercept, γ0(prc), and a linear time
trend, γ1(prc):
λLI/IL(prc, t) = γ0(prc) + γ1(prc)t+ γ2(prc)¯Rt + ζ,
i.e., I use a local projection technique. Appendix D spells out the details.
Figure 9 reports the coefficients, γ2(prc), of the portfolio response to mon-
etary shocks. I use a block bootstrap to estimate confidence bands.
Figure 9 reveals large heterogeneity in the response of portfolio liquidity
to a surprise increase in the federal funds rate. The liquidity ratio of
portfolios held by households in the bottom 40% in terms of wealth falls
by up to 3 percentage points. Only those households in the top of the
wealth distribution respond to a higher return on liquid assets by increasing
the liquidity of their portfolios. Therefore, wealthy households drive the
increase in average liquidity as seen in the Flow of Funds data in Figure 8.
Looking at the change of holdings of liquid and illiquid assets separately
30The house price is the Case-Shiller S&P national house price index. Rents are
imputed on the basis of the CPI for rents of primary residences, fixing the rent-price
ratio in 1983Q1 to 4%.
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Figure 9: Portfolio responses to a monetary shock after 2 years
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Estimated change in portfolio liquidity after a 1 standard deviation monetary
shock, R = 36 basis points (annualized), after 2 years. Portfolio composition
is estimated from the SCF years 1983-2007, only households with at least two
adults and the household head is between 30 and 55 years of age. Bootstrapped
90% confidence bands in dashed-lines, based on a non-parametric bootstrap.
Plotted from the 11th percentile onwards because poorer households hold neg-
ative liquid wealth.
reveals that the sign difference in the portfolio response comes from changes
in liquid asset holdings. While most households lower their liquid asset
holdings, households in the top 20% of the wealth distribution save more
in liquid assets. In contrast, all households lower their savings in illiquid
assets. This is in line with the model.
6 Conclusion
The transmission of monetary policy depends on the distribution of marginal
propensities to consume (MPC) and invest (MPI). The sum of both propen-
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sities, which is the marginal propensity to spend an additional dollar on
goods, matters for aggregate demand, while the propensity to invest mat-
ters for the future capital stock. The key to generating realistic hetero-
geneity in MPCs and MPIs is assets with different degrees of liquidity.
Liquidity-constrained households have high MPCs but low MPIs, which
makes consumption more and investment less elastic to monetary shocks
in comparison to an economy with a representative household.
Redistribution through earnings heterogeneity and the Fisher channel
from unexpected inflation is quantitatively important. The latter depends
on the covariance between inflation-induced redistribution and the marginal
propensities to consume and invest. When the economy is demand-driven,
the Fisher channel amplifies the aggregate effects of monetary shocks through
heterogeneity in propensities to spend. When prices are flexible, in con-
trast, the Fisher channel only works through investment and leads to an
expansion after a monetary tightening.
These results challenge the conventional view of the monetary trans-
mission mechanism that solely focuses on the intertemporal consumption
choice. Quantitatively, equilibrium amplification through income and re-
distribution explains most of the aggregate effects of monetary policy.
To further assess the importance of heterogeneity in household portfo-
lios, the portfolio problem could be extended in a number of dimensions.
So far, the Fisher channel only works through unsecuritized debt in the
model. The introduction of collateralized debt should further increase its
quantitative importance. Modeling long-term debt goes in the same direc-
tion. This also opens a new channel of redistribution through unhedged
interest rate exposures; see Auclert (2015).
More generally, it is important to reassess optimal policy in a New
Keynesian model with incomplete markets to analyze potential trade-offs
between aggregate stabilization and inequality.
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A First Order Conditions
Denote the optimal policies for consumption, bond holdings, and capital
holdings as x∗i , b∗i , k∗, i ∈ {a, n} respectively. Let z be a vector of potential
aggregate states. The first-order conditions for an inner solution in the
(non-)adjustment case read:
k∗ :∂u(x
∗
a)
∂x
q =βE
[
ν
∂Va(b∗a, k∗; z′)
∂k
+ (1− ν)∂Vn(b
∗
a, k
∗; z′)
∂k
]
(21)
b∗a :
∂u(x∗a)
∂x
=βE
[
ν
∂Va(b∗a, k∗; z′)
∂b
+ (1− ν)∂Vn(b
∗
a, k
∗; z′)
∂b
]
(22)
b∗n :
∂u(x∗n)
∂x
=βE
[
ν
∂Va(b∗n, k; z′)
∂b
+ (1− ν)∂Vn(b
∗
n, k; z′)
∂b
]
(23)
Note the subtle difference between (22) and (23) that is the different capital
stocks k∗ vs. k in the right-hand side expressions.
Differentiating the value functions with respect to k and b, I obtain the
following:
∂Va(b, k; z)
∂k
= ∂u[x
∗
a(b, k; z)]
∂x
(q(z) + r(z)) (24)
∂Va(b, k; z)
∂b
= ∂u[x
∗
a(b, k; z)]
∂x
Rb(z)
pi(z) (25)
∂Vn(b, k; z)
∂b
= ∂u[x
∗
n(b, k; z)]
∂x
Rb(z)
pi(z) (26)
∂Vn(b, k; z)
∂k
= r(z)∂u[x
∗
n(b, k; z)]
∂x
(27)
+ βE
[
ν
∂Va[b∗n(b, k; z), k; z′]
∂k
+ (1− ν)∂Vn[b
∗
n(b, k; z), k; z′]
∂k
]
= r(z)∂u[x
∗
n(b, k; z)]
∂x
+ βνE∂u{x
∗
a[b∗n(b, k; z), k; z], k; z′}
∂x
(q(z′) + r(z′))
+ β(1− ν)E∂Vn{[b
∗
n(b, k; z), k; z], k; z′}
∂k
The marginal value of capital in the case of non-adjustment is defined
recursively.
Substituting the second set of equations into the first set of equations,
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I obtain the following Euler equations (in slightly shortened notation):
∂u[x∗a(b, k; z)]
∂x
q(z) =βE
[
ν
∂u[x∗a(b∗a, k∗; z′)]
∂x
[q(z′) + r(z′)] + (1− ν)∂V
n(b∗a, k∗; z′)
∂k
]
(28)
∂u[x∗a(b, k; z)]
∂x
=βER
b(z′)
pi(z′)
[
ν
∂u[x∗a(b∗a, k∗; z′)]
∂x
+ (1− ν)∂u[x
∗
n(b∗a, k∗; z′)]
∂x
]
(29)
∂u[x∗n(b, k, ; z)]
∂x
=βER
b(z′)
pi(z′)
[
ν
∂u[x∗a(b∗n, k; z′)]
∂x
+ (1− ν)∂u[x
∗
n(b∗n, k; z′)]
∂x
]
(30)
In words, the optimal portfolio allocation compares the one-period re-
turn difference between the two assets for the case of adjustment and non-
adjustment, taking into account the adjustment probability. In case of
adjustment, the return difference is ERb(z′)
pi(z′) −E r(z
′)+q(z′)
q(z) weighted with the
marginal utility under adjustment. In case of non-adjustment, the return
difference becomes ERb(z′)
pi(z′)
∂u[x∗n(b∗a,k′;z′)]
∂x
− ∂V n(b∗a,k′;z′)
∂k′ , where the latter part
is the marginal value of illiquid assets when not adjusting. The latter re-
flects both the utility derived from the dividend stream and the utility from
occasionally selling the asset.
For Online Publication
B Numerical Solution
My model has a three-dimensional idiosyncratic state space with two en-
dogenous states. This renders solving the model by perturbing the his-
togram and the value functions on a full grid infeasible such that I cannot
apply a perturbation method without state-space reduction as done in Re-
iter (2002).
Instead, I apply a method developed in joint-work with Christian Bayer.
Bayer et al. (2015) propose a variant of Reiter’s (2009) method to solve
heterogeneous agent models with aggregate risk. The key to reducing the
dimensionality of the system is Sklar’s Theorem. I write the distribution
function in its copula form: Θt = Ct(F bt , F kt , F ht ) with the copula Ct and the
marginal distributions for liquid and illiquid assets and productivity F b,k,ht .
Assuming Ct = C breaks the curse of dimensionality because one only needs
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to perturb the marginal distributions.
The idea behind this approach is that given the economic structure of
the model, prices only depend on aggregate asset demand and supply, as
in Krusell and Smith (1998), and not directly on higher moments of the
joint distributions Θt,Θt+1. Fixing the copula to its steady state imposes
no restriction on how the marginal distributions change, i.e., how many
more or less liquid assets the portfolios of the x-th percentile have. It only
restricts the change in the likelihood of a household being among the x-
percent richest in liquid assets to be among the y-percent richest in illiquid
assets.
For the policies, I use a sparse polynomial P (b, k, h) with parameters
Ξt = Ξ(RBt ,Θt, Rt ) to approximate the value functions at all grid points
around their value in the stationary equilibrium without aggregate risk,
V SS(b, k, h). For example, I write the value function as
V (b, k, h;RBt ,Θt, Rt )/V SS(b, k, h) ≈ P (b, k, h)Ξt.
Note the difference to a global approximation of the value function for
finding the stationary equilibrium without aggregate risk. Here, I only use
the sparse polynomial to capture deviations from the stationary equilibrium
values, cf. Ahn et al. (2018) and different from Winberry (2016) and Reiter
(2009). I define the polynomial basis functions such that the grid points of
the full grid coincide with the Chebyshev nodes for this basis.
The economic model boils down to a dynamic system that can be rep-
resented by a set of non-linear difference equations, for which hold
EtF (Xt, Xt+1, Yt, Yt+1) = 0,
where the set of control variables is Yt = (∂Vt∂b ,
∂Vt
∂k
, Y˜t), i.e., derivatives of the
value function with respect to b and k as well as some aggregate controls Y˜t
such as dividends, wages, etc. The set of state variablesXt = (Θt, RBt , Rt ) is
given by the histogram Θt of the distribution over (b, k, h) and the aggregate
states RBt and Rt .
Finally, I check the quality of the linearized solution (in aggregate
shocks) by solving the household planning problem given the implied ex-
pected continuation values from the approximate solution but solving for
the actual intratemporal equilibrium, as suggested by Den Haan (2010).
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Table 4: Den Haan (2010) statistic
Absolute error (in %) for
Price of Capital qt Capital Kt Inflation pit Real Bonds Bt
Mean 0.03 0.30 0.06 0.76
Max 0.06 0.72 0.19 2.24
Notes: Differences in percent between the simulation of the linearized solution
of the model with monetary shocks and a simulation in which I solve for
the actual intratemporal equilibrium prices in every period given the implied
expected continuation values for t = {1, ..., 250}; see Den Haan (2010).
I simulate the economy over T=250 periods and calculate the differences
between the linearized solution and the non-linear one. The maximum dif-
ference is 0.72% for the capital stock and 2.24% for bonds while the mean
absolute errors are substantially smaller; see Table 4. Absolute errors for
equilibrium bond supply are the largest because of the high autocorrelation
in bonds supply (ρB = 0.98). With balanced budget rule, ρB = 0.0, the
absolute errors are smaller than 1%.
C Description of Aggregate and Cross-Sectional
Data
C.1 Data from the Flow of Funds
The financial accounts of the Flow of Funds (FoF), Table Z1, report the
aggregate balance sheet of the U.S. household sector (including nonprofit
organizations serving households). I use this data in my analysis to measure
changes in the aggregate ratio of net liquid to net illiquid assets on a quar-
terly basis. The asset taxonomy is the following and closely corresponds to
my definition of liquidity in the cross-sectional data.
Net liquid assets are defined as total currency and deposits, money
market fund shares, various types of debt securities (Treasury, agency- and
GSE-backed, municipal, corporate and foreign), loans (as assets), and total
miscellaneous assets net of consumer credit, depository institution loans
n.e.c., and other loans and advances.
Net illiquid wealth includes real estate at market value, life insur-
40
ance reserves, pension entitlements, equipment and non-residential intel-
lectual property products of non-profit organizations, proprietors’ equity in
non-corporate business, corporate equities, mutual fund shares subtracting
home mortgages as well as commercial mortgages.
C.2 Data from the Survey of Consumer Finances
I use nine waves of the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF, 1983-2007) for
the empirical analysis of the response of household portfolios to monetary
shocks and for the calibration of the model. I restrict the sample to house-
holds with two married adults whose head is between 30 and 55 years of
age to control for changing demographics and exclude education and re-
tirement decisions that are not explicitly modeled. The asset taxonomy is
the following.
Net liquid assets include all households’ savings and checking accounts,
call and money market accounts (incl. money market funds), certificates of
deposit, all types of bonds (such as savings bonds, U.S. government bonds,
Treasury bills, mortgage-backed bonds, municipal bonds, corporate bonds,
foreign and other tax-free bonds), and private loans net of credit card debt.
All other assets are considered illiquid. Most households hold their
illiquid wealth in real estate and pension wealth from retirement accounts
and life insurance policies. Furthermore, I treat business assets, other non-
financial and managed assets and corporate equity in the form of directly
held mutual funds and stocks as illiquid, because a large share of equities
owned by private households is not publicly traded nor widely circulated
(see Kaplan et al., 2018). From gross illiquid asset holdings, I subtract all
debt except for credit card debt.
I exclude cars and car debt from the analysis altogether. What is more,
I exclude from the analysis households that hold massive amounts of credit
card debt such that their net liquid assets are below minus half of the
average quarterly household income – the debt limit I use in the model.
Moreover, I exclude all households with negative equity in illiquid assets.
This excludes roughly 5% of U.S. households on average from the analysis.
Figure 10 and Table 5 display some key statistics of the distribution of
liquid and illiquid assets in the population and the model.
I estimate the asset holdings at each percentile of the net wealth distri-
bution by running a local linear regression that maps the percentile rank
41
Figure 10: Average portfolio liquidity by liquid/net wealth quintiles
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(c) Model (d) Data
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Notes: Panels (a) and (b): Estimated net liquid asset holdings relative to es-
timated net illiquid assets by quintile of the liquid wealth distribution. Panels
(c) and (d): Estimated positive liquid asset holdings relative to estimated net
illiquid assets by quintile of the net wealth distribution.
Average over the estimates from the SCFs 1983-2007 (for households composed
of at least two adults whose head is between 30 and 55 years of age). Estimation
by a local linear estimator with a Gaussian kernel and a bandwidth of 0.1.
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in net wealth into the net liquid and net illiquid asset holdings. In detail,
let LIit and ILit be the value of liquid and illiquid assets of household i
in the SCF of year t, respectively. Let ωit be its sample weight. Then I
first sort households by net wealth (LIt + ILt) and calculate the percentile
rank of a household i as prcit =
∑
j<i ωjt/
∑
j ωjt. I then run for each per-
centile, prc = 0.01, 0.02, . . . 1, a local linear regression. For this regression,
I calculate the weight of household i as wit =
√
φ(prcit−prc
h
)ωit, where φ
is the probability density function of a standard normal, and h = 0.1 is
the bandwidth. I then estimate the liquid and illiquid asset holdings at
percentile prc at time t as the intercepts λLI,IL(prc, t) obtained from the
weighted regressions for year t:
witLIit = λLI(prc, t)wit + βLI(prc, t)(prcit − prc)wit + ζLIit , (31)
witILit = λIL(prc, t)wit + βIL(prc, t)(prcit − prc)wit + ζILit , (32)
where ζLI/IL are error terms.
Figure 11 compares the percentage deviations of average portfolio liq-
uidity, ∑prc λLI(prc, t)/∑prc λIL(prc, t), from their long-run mean to those
obtained from the FoF data for the years 1983 to 2007. Both data sources
capture very similar changes in the liquidity ratio over time.
The average liquid to illiquid assets ratios, however, differ between the
SCF and FoF. The SCF systematically underestimates gross financial as-
sets and, hence, liquid asset holdings. The liquidity ratio in the FoF is
roughly 20%, about twice as large as the one in the SCF. One reason is
that households are more likely to underestimate their deposits and bonds
due to a large number of potential asset items, whereas they tend to over-
estimate the value of their real estate and equity (compare also Table C.1.
in Kaplan et al., 2018).
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Table 5: Household portfolio composition:
Survey of Consumer Finances 1983-2007
Married households with head between 30 and 55 years of age
Moments Model Data
Fraction with b < 0 0.16 0.16
Fraction with k > 0 0.88 0.91
Fraction with b ≤ 0 and k > 0 0.11 0.13
Gini liquid wealth 0.80 0.88
Gini illiquid wealth 0.78 0.78
Gini total wealth 0.78 0.78
Notes: Averages over the SCFs 1983-2007 using the respective cross-
sectional sampling weights. Households whose liquid asset holdings
fall below minus half of the average quarterly income are dropped from
the sample. Ratios of liquid to illiquid wealth are estimated by first
estimating local linear functions that map the percentile of the wealth
distribution into average liquid and average illiquid asset holdings for
each year, then averaging over years and finally calculating the ratios.
Figure 11: Deviation of portfolio liquidity from mean in SCF and FoF
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C.3 Other Aggregate Data
Section 5 shows the impulse response functions of the log of real GDP,
real personal consumption expenditures, and real gross private investment.
These variables are taken from the national accounts data provided by the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (Series: PCEC, GPDI). GDP is calcu-
lated as the sum of real consumption, real investment, and real government
purchases (GCEC1).
Data on the federal funds rate and the liquidity premium come from the
same source. I construct the liquidity premium from nominal house prices,
the CPI for rents, and the federal funds rate. House prices come from the
Case-Shiller S&P U.S. National Home Price Index (CSUSHPINSA) divided
by the all-items CPI (CPIAUCSL). I measure the liquidity premium as the
excess realized return on housing. This is composed of the rent-price-ratio,
Rh,t, in t plus the quarterly growth rate of house prices in t+ 1, Ht+1Ht , over
the nominal rate, RBt , (converted to a quarterly rate):
LPt =
Rh,t
Ht
+ Ht+1
Ht
− (1 +RBt )
1
4 . (33)
Rents are imputed on the basis of the CPI for rents on primary residences
paid by all urban consumers (CUSR0000SEHA) fixing the rent-price-ratio
in 1983Q1 to 4%.
D Details on the Empirical Estimates of the
Response to Monetary Shocks
D.1 Local Projection Method for Aggregate Data
Figure 8 of Section 5 shows impulse response functions based on local pro-
jections (see Jordà, 2005). This method does not require the specification
and estimation of a vector autoregressive model for the true data gener-
ating process. Instead, in the spirit of multi-step direct forecasting, the
impulse responses of the endogenous variables Υ at time t+ j to monetary
shocks, Rt , at time t are estimated using horizon-specific single regressions,
in which the endogenous variable shifted ahead is regressed on the current
normalized monetary shock ¯Rt (with standard deviation 1), a constant, a
time trend, and controls Xt−1. These controls are specified as the lagged
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federal funds rate RBt−1 and the log of GDP Yt−1, consumption Ct−1, invest-
ment It−1, and of lagged monetary shocks Rt−1, Rt−2:
Υt+j = βj,0 + βj,1t+ βj,2¯Rt + βj,3Xt−1 + νt+j, j = 0...15 (34)
Hence, the impulse response function βj,0 is just a sequence of projections
of Υt+j in response to the shock ¯Rt , local to each forecast horizon j = 0...15.
I focus on the post-Volcker disinflation era and use aggregate time series
data from 1983Q1 to 2007Q4.
An important assumption made for employing the local projection method,
which directly regresses the shocks on the endogenous variable of interest,
is that the identified monetary shocks Rt obtained from narrative approach
are exogenous. To this end, I use monetary shocks identified by Wieland
and Yang (2016) that improve on the original shock series by Romer and
Romer (2004).
E Distributional Consequences: Gini Indexes
Figure 12: Response of inequality to a monetary shock
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Notes: Impulse responses of Gini indexes of wealth, income, and consumption
to an 36 basis points (annualized) monetary policy shock, R. The y-axis shows
basis point changes (an increase of “100” implies an increase in the Gini index
from, say, 0.78 to 0.79).
Figure 12 displays the Gini indexes for total wealth, income, and con-
sumption. Inequality in income and consumption instantaneously react to
the contractionary monetary policy shock, whereas wealth inequality slowly
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builds up. The initial increase in the Gini index for income is almost 10
times larger than the increase in the Gini index for consumption. This
implies substantial consumption smoothing. The dynamics of income in-
equality follow the response of inflation, which quickly returns to its steady
state value and with it profits as well. The increase in consumption inequal-
ity, in contrast, is more persistent because of a prolonged time of higher
wealth inequality.
F Model Extensions
F.1 Model without liquidity friction
To highlight the importance of the liquidity friction, I solve a version of the
model in which both assets are liquid. In this case, the household portfolio
position between the two assets is indeterminate in the steady state as long
as the expected returns of both assets are equal
Et
[
rt+1 +
qt+1
qt
]
= Et
[
Rbt+1
pit+1
]
, (35)
and in equilibrium they must be equal for households to be willing to hold
a positive amount of both assets.
Since the solution method linearizes the problem in the presence of
aggregate shocks, the portfolio problem remains indeterminate. Therefore,
I assume that all households hold the same bond-to-capital ratio, which
is in the aggregate determined by (35) and by the supply of government
bonds.
Figure 13 plots the aggregate effects of a monetary tightening in this
environment. Output falls by 13% more relative to the baseline economy
with heterogeneity in portfolios because the fall of investment is substan-
tially stronger. The investment response is now only 10% smaller than with
complete markets. Heterogeneity in the response of household portfolios
therefore explains most of the decline in the elasticity of investment to mon-
etary shocks. Aggregate liquidity, Bt/Kt, increases and so does individual
portfolio liquidity by assumption in the case of liquid capital. Additionally,
the (ex-post) liquidity premium increases, which is counterfactual; compare
to Figure 8.
Aggregate capital adjustment costs are no substitute for heterogene-
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Figure 13: Aggregate response to a monetary shock with liquid capital
Output Yt Consumption Ct Composite Xt**
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Notes: Impulse responses to a 1 standard deviation monetary policy shock,
R = 36 basis points (annualized). All rates (dividends, interest, liquidity pre-
mium) are not annualized. *LP = Etqt+1+rtqt −
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Figure 14: Aggregate response to a monetary shock with liquid capital and
recalibrated aggregate capital adjustment costs
Output Yt Consumption Ct Composite Xt**
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Notes: Impulse responses to a 1 standard deviation monetary policy shock,
R = 36 basis points (annualized). All rates (dividends, interest, liquidity pre-
mium) are not annualized. *LP = Etqt+1+rtqt −
RBt
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ity in household portfolios. Figure 14 shows the impulse responses of an
economy with liquid capital but with recalibrated adjustment costs pa-
rameter, φ, such that investment falls exactly as in the baseline. In this
case, consumption and output fall by around 40% less as well. Aggregate
capital adjustment costs mainly rescale the aggregate effects of monetary
policy, but do not affect the composition of the output drop in terms of
consumption and investment to the extent that heterogeneity in household
portfolios does.
F.2 Model without aggregate capital adjustment costs
Figure 16 plots the aggregate effects of a monetary tightening in the baseline
model without aggregate capital adjustment costs, φ = 0. The aggregate
effects become more pronounced because investment falls more, while the
price of capital is now constant. Overall, the results are very similar to the
baseline. The fall in portfolio liquidity in the cross-section is also slightly
stronger; see Figure 15.
When markets are complete, investment falls by 4.7% on impact with-
out aggregate capital adjustment costs. Therefore, the difference to the
model with incomplete markets becomes substantially larger when aggre-
gate adjustment costs approach zero.
Figure 15: Portfolio response without aggregate capital adjustment costs
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Notes: Change in portfolio liquidity after a 1 standard deviation monetary
shock, R = 36 basis points (annualized), after 2 years. Policies by wealth
percentile are estimated using a local linear regression technique with a Gaussian
kernel and a bandwidth of 0.1. Plotted from the 11th percentile onwards because
poorer households hold negative liquid wealth.
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Figure 16: Aggregate response to a monetary shock without aggregate
capital adjustment costs
Output Yt Consumption Ct Composite Xt**
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Notes: Impulse responses to a 1 standard deviation monetary policy shock,
R = 36 basis points (annualized). All rates (dividends, interest, liquidity pre-
mium) are not annualized. *LP = Etqt+1+rtqt −
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F.3 Allocation of profits
In the baseline model the allocation of profits follows a simple and trans-
parent rule that allocates profits to a random and small fraction of house-
holds. These households have zero productivity in the labor market but
earn roughly 15 times more than the average worker. This mimics the U.S.
distribution of income in terms of inequality and composition of income.
According to the Congressional Budget Office, the top 1% of the income
distribution receives about 30% of their income from financial income, a
much larger share than any other segment of the population.
A lump-sum allocation of profits, in contrast, does not match these
facts. It further makes earnings-risk procyclical in the model, which miti-
gates the aggregate effects of monetary policy shocks. Figure 18 plots the
impulse responses for the model with lump-sum allocation of profits and
without the ‘entrepreneur’ state (no parameters are recalibrated). The
model still generates a sign difference in the portfolio response for wealthy
and poor households, but the magnitude of the portfolio response is smaller;
See Figure 17.
Figure 17: Portfolio response with lump-sum profits
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Notes: Change in portfolio liquidity after a 1 standard deviation monetary
shock, R = 36 basis points (annualized), after 2 years. Policies by wealth
percentile are estimated using a local linear regression technique with a Gaussian
kernel and a bandwidth of 0.1. Plotted from the 11th percentile onwards because
poorer households hold negative liquid wealth.
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Figure 18: Aggregate response to a monetary shock with lump-sum profits
Output Yt Consumption Ct Composite Xt**
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Notes: Impulse responses to a 1 standard deviation monetary policy shock,
R = 36 basis points (annualized). All rates (dividends, interest, liquidity pre-
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F.4 Model without sticky prices
Figure 19 plots the aggregate effects of a monetary tightening in the baseline
model without sticky prices, κ = 0. While inflation responds strongly
in the first period, the monetary shock does not move the real interest
rate that households face from period 1 onwards. Monetary policy still
affects real variables through the interaction of the Fisher channel and
heterogeneity in marginal propensities to invest. The ex-post redistribution
through inflation from borrowers to savers leads to an investment boom
because savers have higher marginal propensities to invest. Heterogeneity
in marginal propensities to consume, on the other hand, does not affect
output because falling prices restore any shortfall in demand. Overall, a
monetary tightening leads to an expansion through the Fisher effect on
investment when prices are flexible.
In a model with real debt, there is no redistribution through surprise
inflation. In response to a monetary tightening, inflation falls until the
Taylor rule undoes the increase in the nominal rate, and the real rate
stays constant from period 1 onwards. The sizable movement of inflation,
however, does not affect real variables because the Fisher channel is absent;
see Figure 20.
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Figure 19: Aggregate response to a monetary shock without sticky prices
Output Yt Consumption Ct Composite Xt**
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Notes: Impulse responses to a 1 standard deviation monetary policy shock,
R = 36 basis points (annualized). All rates (dividends, interest, liquidity pre-
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Figure 20: Aggregate response to a monetary shock without sticky prices
and real debt
Output Yt Consumption Ct Composite Xt**
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Notes: Impulse responses to a 1 standard deviation monetary policy shock,
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F.5 Robustness to fiscal rules
When markets are incomplete, Ricardian equivalence does not hold, and
fiscal policy matters for the monetary transmission. A change in real rates
affect the government budget constraint. In turn, the government may
either change spending or taxes and do it now or in the future. The choice
of fiscal rules matters because they affect different households who may
differ in marginal propensities to consume and invest.
In the baseline model, I assume that most of the adjustment goes
through government debt, and future government spending adjusts to bring
debt back to steady state. In Figure 22, in contrast, I assume a balanced
budget, ρB = 0, and an immediate reaction of government spending. The
substantial fall in government spending amplifies the recessionary effect of
a monetary tightening. Additionally, the fall in output is driven to an even
larger extent by consumption. Investment falls less than in the baseline.
Alternatively, taxes may adjust to balance the budget as shown in Fig-
ure 23. In this case, consumption falls less and investment more relative
to baseline. In comparison to complete markets, investment falls in both
cases by around 50% less with heterogeneity in household portfolios. In
both cases, the sign difference in the portfolio responses remains and the
magnitude of the fall in portfolio liquidity even increases; see Figure 21.
Figure 21: Portfolio response, ∆(bit/kit), with balanced budget
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Notes: Change in portfolio liquidity after a 1 standard deviation monetary shock,
R = 36 basis points (annualized), after 2 years. Policies by wealth percentile
are estimated using a local linear regression technique with a Gaussian kernel and
a bandwidth of 0.1. Plotted from the 11th percentile onwards because poorer
households hold negative liquid wealth.
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Figure 22: Aggregate response to a monetary shock with balanced budget
by adjusting government spending
Output Yt Consumption Ct Composite Xt**
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Figure 23: Aggregate response to a monetary shock with balanced budget
by adjusting the tax rate
Output Yt Consumption Ct Composite Xt**
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Notes: Impulse responses to a 1 standard deviation monetary policy shock,
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F.6 Response of the Model to TFP Shocks
This section reports the aggregate effects of a TFP shock for comparison.
I generate the IRFs by solving the model without monetary shocks but
with time-varying total factor productivity in production, such that Yt =
ZtF (Kt, Lt), where Zt is total factor productivity and follows an AR(1)
process in logs. I assume a persistence of 0.9 and a standard deviation of
0.007. Additionally, I change the autocorrelation of government debt to
ρB = 0.86, which I estimate from the data.
Figure 24: Aggregate response to a TFP shock
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Notes: Impulse responses to a one standard deviation increase in TFP.
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